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The New Rich in China: 
Why There is No New Middle Class 
DAVID S. G. GOODMAN* 
Economic reform in the People's Republic of China [PRC] since 
1980 has seen the emergence of new categories of wealth and 
power. Collectively and colloquially these new categories have been 
referred to as the 'new rich'. They have also been referred to both 
inside and outside of the PRC as the new middle class (or middle 
classes) if for different reasons. While there are good reasons for 
accepting this designation, the evidence from surveys of new rich 
entrepreneurs conducted since the early 1990s in different parts of 
the PRC (Zhejiang, Shanxi, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Hainan) suggests 
caution. In terms of hierarchies of wealth, status and power the new 
rich not only represent a significant component of the current ruling 
class, but perhaps, more significantly, highlight the dimensions for 
the long-term future. 
It is clearly the case that there has been massive social change in 
the wake of rapid economic growth in the People's Republic of China 
[PRC] since the early 1980s. To take the most obvious example, the 
creation of wealth on a dramatic scale has meant that the PRC has 
become very unequal. In 1978 the PRC was a fairly equal society in 
terms of income, albeit an equality of poverty to some considerable 
extent. The Gini Coefficient is one of the standard measures of equality 
where equality is represented as 0 and inequality as 1. In 2005 the 
• David S. G. Goodman is Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of 
Sydney, where he is also Director of the Institute of Social Sciences. His most 
recent publications are The New Rich in China: Future Rulers, Present 
Lives (2008) and Centre and Province in the People's Republic of China: 
Sichuan and Guizhou, 1955-1965 (2009). This inaugural lecture was delivered 
to the Arts Association on 4 March, 2010. 
13 
PRC's Gini Coefficient was about 0.46 and it had become one of the 
most unequal societies in the world. Regional income inequality grew 
rapidly away frum a principle of self~sufficiency to a position in which 
the poorest provincial-level jurisdiction (Cuizhou) has less than 8 per 
cent of the CDP per capita of the richest (Shanghai).l 
The prime beneficiaries and the agents of the dramatic economic 
growth have been a whole range of new entrepreneurs who, in large 
and small ways, in retail, manufacturing and services, have invented, 
invested, owned, and managed their way to varying degrees of 
wealth. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s these entrepreneurs 
have been increasingly described as China's new 'middle class' or 
'middle classes' by academic and more general media commentators 
outside the PRC.2 In the process a parallel is clearly being implied 
between the PRe's socio-development since the late 1970s and the 
consequences of industrialisation in Europe over a longer period 
starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
While a rhetoric of convergence between once apparently widely 
divergent social and economic systems is comforting, and is an oft 
repeated sub-theme inside and outside the PRC, this assumption of 
equivalence is also easily rushed. The middle class is not a simple 
concept but is made up of different elements and is itself often 
regarded as stratified: one clear reason that reference is also often 
made to the middle classes in the plural. Interestingly, the middle 
classes are now generally seen in industrialised societies as the large, 
middle sectors of contemporary hierarchies of economic wealth, social 
status and political power, identified as much by their consumption 
and adherence to style as in socia-economic terms.3 
Current conceptualisations of the middle classes are related to, but 
somewhat different from, the emergence of the concept of middle 
class and its origins in the European context. Though the concept is 
necessarily complex it can be broadly reduced to two general and 
historically determined definitions: the bourgeoisie, and (separately) 
the managers of the modern state. Starting with the early nineteenth 
century, the bourgeoisie were a new middle class created by the 
process of industrialisation. They were the captains of industry whose 
ownership of the means of production - extraction, processing and 
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manufacturing activities - drove industrialisation, and they became a 
middle class because they were neither the landed aristocracy on the 
one hand, nor ordinary townspeople on the other. As industrialisation 
deepened towards the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries, both economic enterprises and the modem state 
itself became more complex, producing managerial and professional 
classes. These too were a new middle class because while they neither 
owned capital nor controlled the state, they served either or both and 
derived their income and status from service and management rather 
than ownership of the means of production.4 
In both cases the significance of these new middle classes is as much 
political as it is social and economic, if not more. The demand for a 
widening of the franchise and the emergence of liberal democracy 
during the first half of the nineteenth century in Northwest Europe 
are often seen as necessary results of the emergence of the bourgeoisie. 
The managerial revolution of the first half of the twentieth century 
is part and parcel of the development of mass society, mass politics 
and the welfare state.s 
While the PRe has clearly seen the emergence of new categories 
of entrepreneurs, the key question is the extent to which these new 
rich can be identified as the equivalent of the middle classes in 
other, earlier socio-economic contexts.6 There is certainly a much-in-
evidence discourse of middle classness to be found in descriptions of 
social change in the PRe from the outside as well as in domestic self-
description? To some extent and from some perspectives, regardless 
of socio-economic construction, the assumption of middle class 
behaviour especially in patterns of consumption is not just reasonable, 
it is also to be expected as a function of globalised commercialisation. 
Gucci, Loewe and Louis Vuitton are brands targeted at the wealthy 
consumer in Shanghai and Beijing as much as in Milan, London and 
New York. 
At the same time there is room for caution lest too much is read 
into the PRC's processes of social change. Identification of middle 
class behaviour in the contemporary PRe does not necessary entail 
an equation with earlier middle classes in other societies, and it is 
clearly just as necessary to isolate differences as well as similarities. 
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In particular, there are three aspects of the emergence of the PRes 
new rich categories of entrepreneurs - which separately highlight 
their relationship to social status, economic wealth and political 
power - that suggest they are less a new middle class than a future 
central part of the ruling class. In a sense the PRC had a managerial 
revolution before a bourgeois revolution (though of course history 
does not start in 1949) with the creation of managerial and professional 
classes as part of the development of the modernising state during 
the 1950s. Certainly the entrepreneurs of the post-1978 era include not 
just the comfortably well-off but also, more dramatically, the rich and 
the super-rich. At the same time they have been and remain unlike 
the European bourgeoisie of the first half of the nineteenth century 
in the extent to which they have emerged from, and have close 
organisational relationships with, the established political system. 
The PRC and the Middle Class 
It is considerably easier to regard the new rich of the post-1978 
PRe as equivalent to a contemporary European or North American 
middle class if modernisation is dated only from the post-Mao era. 
However, the sustained economic development experienced since 
the early 1980s is not China's first taste of modernisation. Though 
modernisation is clearly a contested concept, in broad terms it is 
possible to identify three eras of industrialisation and modernisation 
in China's twentieth-century experience. 
The Republican Era saw sustained attempts at modernisation 
in various parts of China under both warlord rule and colonial 
influence.8 This included the development of the iron and steel 
industry, large scale coal mining, a machinery industry, a textile 
industry, financial institutions, shipping and railways, as well as an 
exceptionally large cigarette industry. Largely because much of this 
economic activity was externally sourced, owned or supported, by 
the early 1920s some of China's various economies were considerably 
better integrated into the world economy than was later to be the case 
from 1937 through to 1978.9 Even mountainous counties some distance 
from the coast, such as Liaoxian in North China's hinterland (on the 
16 
borders of Shanxi and Hebei Provinces), were supplying products to 
external markets by the 1930s.1o 
Of probably greater importance to understanding the most recent 
political economy of change, the establishment of the PRC, once 
the new regime was secured, ushered in a renewed and sustained 
industrialisation and modernisation after the dislocation of the 
1930s and 1940s. The years from 1952 to 1978 were not without their 
economic problems, notably during the early 1960s when the economy 
threatened to implode in the wake of the Great Leap Forward, or 
during the height of the Cultural Revolution when production was 
impeded. Nonetheless, the PRC economy achieved an overall six per 
cent per annum growth rate throughout the Mao-dominated era. ll 
At the heart of this growth was the development of a modem 
state, including the construction of communications networks and 
the provision of education, health and welfare infrastructure, if 
more focused on the urban than on the rural areas. Certainly the 
bourgeoisie and generally the large scale owners of property were 
dispossessed during a series of campaigns designed to ensure the 
socialisation of the means of production during 1952-55,12 At the 
same time the 1950s saw the growth of managerial and professional 
occupations in the service of the new state and of its administration 
and economic management. This involved people who in many ways 
can be regarded as the backbone middle classes of the PRC: though 
that is clearly not a term that would have been employed in the 
PRC itself during an era dominated by the ideological formulations 
of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong thought. They were, and to a 
large extent still remain, both socially and individually, officials who 
were the instruments of the state and capital as opposed to strategic 
decision-makers or front-line producers. 
The establishment and development of the new state required a 
sizeable force of officials. While considerable attention always focuses 
on the cadres, and leading cadres at that, who peopled the Party-state, 
the new bureaucracy also engendered a large army of lower order 
officials and administrators, referred to in Chinese as 'petty cadres' 
(xiao ganbu ).13 To a large extent these petty cadres were the essence of 
the bureaucratic state established by the Chinese Communist Party 
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[CCP]. The more senior cadre positions were most usually filled by 
those who had joined the CCP and the revolution before the end of 
the War of Re~blance in 1945. As the Communist movement grew 
during the Civil War these individuals attained positions of leadership 
which then transferred to the new state in and after 1949 as the ccr 
expanded from North and Northeast China to occupy the whole of 
the country, and they effectively became the new ruling class.14 Under 
their leadership the Party-state not only had responsibility for state 
administration and regulation of social life, but also provided social 
and welfare services, and ran the economy. Economic production 
was completely state directed even though only part of the economy 
was managed immediately through government departments. The 
officials, administrators and managers who staffed this extensive 
bureaucracy were initially during the early 1950s hired locally and, 
while that practice continued, it was supplemented by the allocation 
of university students on graduation to positions anywhere in the 
PRC,15 
Alongside, and sometimes overlapping with, the bureaucracy of 
state socialism the new state also ensured the further development 
of the professions, which expanded way beyond their beginnings 
in the Republican Era. Teachers, doctors and engineers were the 
most numerous as the modernising state expanded its activities and 
reach. At the same time the 1950s also saw the emergence of career 
paths for other professions including lawyers and economists, albeit 
heavily politicised. These intellectual middle classes were precisely 
those who were criticised during the Cultural Revolution in the late 
1960s for having become the 'stinking ninth category of counter 
revolutionaries'. Many lost their positions and possessions, at least 
temporarily until the 1970s, were sent to the countryside or the 
front-line-of-production for 're-education' and some were physically 
abused. 
The PRC's drive for further industrialisation and modernisation 
after 1978 appealed to, and to some extent relied on, these managerial 
middle classes and their families. Just as the reputations of leading 
cadres removed during the Cultural Revolution, and sometimes 
the individuals themselves, came for the most part to be gradually 
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restored through the 1970s, so too middle-class reputations rose again. 
The process of restoring their positions in society and employment 
had already started well before Mao's death in September 1976. 
However, the late 1970s saw a more complete and explicit restoration, 
often including the payment of reparations. Education and training 
were generally put back on the agenda by the Party-state as it 
sought economic growth, and the various types of professional 
knowledge and expertise were to be once again mobilised to the 
PRC's developmental goals. 
Entrepreneurs and enterprise development 
The identification of professional and managerial middle classes in 
the PRC does not necessarily mean that the entrepreneurs to have 
emerged as a result of the economic reforms introduced since 1978 are 
not also middle class. It does however require that they be examined 
as such more closely both in terms of the PRC's development and in 
the wider comparative context. In particular it draws attention to the 
specific characteristics of the new entrepreneurs as a middle class, and 
their relationship to the professional and managerial classes. Clearly 
these two broad social categories may have much in common, not 
the least of which is a shared set of life-style aspirations, including 
living in one's own house, having a car, ensuring private education 
for one's children, and engaging in leisure time activities that may 
include holidays elsewhere.17 It is also possible that members of the 
pre-1978 professional and managerial middle classes transformed 
themselves into new-style entrepreneurs during the 1980s. At the 
same time acknowledgment that there has been, and remains, a 
state-sponsored professional and managerial middle class does 
suggest that the new entrepreneurs may not only be a different kind 
of middle class but also that the processes of middle class formation 
and conceptualisation in the PRe may be somewhat different from 
those that occurred in the earlier European context. 
Since the early 1990s, a series of interviews of entrepreneurs have 
been undertaken in different parts of China. These have included 
surveys in Hangzhou (1991-93), Shanxi Province (1996-98, and again 
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2000-02), Qinghai Province (2001-03), Jiaocheng County, Shanxi 
(2003-04), Qiongshan City, Hainan (2004), and Mianyang City, 
Sichuan Province (2004-05).18 Entrepreneurs have been asked about 
their social backgrounds (and that of their families), their careers and 
their entrepreneurial activities. In terms of middle-class formation, 
there are three clear conclusions highlighted in each set of interviews. 
The first is that the new entrepreneurs are a complex and not a simple 
social category, including not only mvner-operators in the private 
~~ctor but also managers of state-, collectively-, privately-. and 
foreign-owned enterprises, as well as of times confusing combinations 
of these various sub-categories.19 The second relates to the wealth 
of the new entrepreneurs. While there were some disastrously 
unsuccessful entrepreneurs and others who were only of moderate 
wealth, many were not just comfortably well-off by the standards 
of their local economy when interviews were conducted, but were 
clearly the rich and the super-rich. This conclusion draws attention 
to the parallels between the contemporary new entrepreneurs in the 
PRC and the nineteenth-century European bourgeoisie. The third 
overall conclusion limits such arguments by highlighting the close 
institutional and associationallinks between the new entrepreneurs 
and the Party-state: they are neither independent of nor excluded 
from the political establishment, which on the contrary seeks actively 
to incorporate them. 
The notion of any ab initio industrialisation in the PRC since 1978 is 
rapidly dispelled by consideration of the processes that generated new 
entrepreneurs in the reform era. The model of a single individual who 
has an idea, seeks capital, and establishes an enterprise to develop 
an invention or innovation is only broadly applicable in the PRC.2o 
Broadly speaking, the new enterprises that have emerged during the 
last three decades have emerged in one of four ways, differentiated 
by source of the initial capital and resources. 
Historically, the introduction of greater measures of market 
determination and the development of new types of enterprise started 
in the rural areas, or more accurately the sub- and peri-urban rural 
districts of cities. Through the 1980s and 1990s town and village 
enterprises [TVEs] became the mainstay of the collective sector of the 
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economy, and grew out of rural economic activities and perceptions 
of spare labour or other forms of under-utilised capacity.21 In the 
Hangzhou area one village transformed its machinery workshop, 
which had access to wire products, into a production line for using 
wire to produce elaborate gift cards for the Japanese market. It was 
soon so successful that the production line became a large-scale factory 
and the village ceased agricultural production. In Yuci (in Shanxi 
Province) another village agricultural machinery workshop turned 
to aluminium radiator production; in Yingchuan (also in Shanxi), 
surrounded by coal-mining, coal by-products, particularly plastics, 
were produced. These enterprises and their development were led 
by local individuals, often the former workshop manager or some 
other level of local leader, who were able to mobilise their fellow 
villagers. Though technically managers and not owners of the TVEs, 
many behaved economically, socially and politically as if they were. 
The state sector of the economy saw similar processes at work. The 
previous system of state socialism had been characterised by large-
scale production and inherent economic inefficiencies. Increasingly 
after 1984 economic reform inevitably resulted in managers seeking 
economic efficiencies and, partly in consequence, new opportunities 
to use the assets they controlled. In a variety of ways state assets were 
developed or built on to produce an economic return. Often subsidiary 
companies operating in the collective sector of the economy were 
established by the state-owned enterprises or departments of the 
state administration.22 
In North China an iron and steel works at the start of the reform 
era was a complex organisation that, like other large scale state owned 
enterprises at that time, attempted to meet most of the social and 
welfare needs of its workforce and their dependents. The enterprise 
had canteens, farmlands to supply the canteens, and trucks to 
transport the agricultural produce to the canteens. Before reform little 
attention was paid to the low level of economic activity generated 
by the canteens or the trucking department since they fulfilled their 
allotted tasks of feeding the workforce and transporting produce to 
the canteens once a day. With reform each of these activities was hived 
off as a separate company, technically owned by the parent state-
21 
o\\'I\ed enterprise, but under the control of the previous management 
who had been assigned to the new collective sector enterprise. Each 
was provided with a contract to provide services as before but now, 
in order to survive, they also had to find additional money-making 
work in the open market. In Hangzhou, the now PRe-wide famous 
Wahaha drink and food company was born from the non-profitable 
print shop of a secondary school when its managers realised that 
to survive they had not just to diversify but to find new economic 
activities. 
Though many of the collective sector enterprises were established 
by state-owned parent enterprises, the reallocation of state assets in 
these ways also sometimes left less than clear distinctions between 
ownership and management. State sector enterprise managers who 
led the way in reforming their companies clearly remained as 
managers whatever their level of emotional investment in the 
newly developed undertakings. Managers of new collective sector 
enterprises that had grown out of state assets on the other hand 
often, like their semi-rural counterparts, behaved in many ways like 
owners. In Hangzhou on one occasion one such entrepreneur was 
asked if the state assets that had been effectively reassigned to his 
new-style enterprise had been repaid in any way. The response was 
clear: 'There's no need. These were previously All-people's assets 
and we are the people'. 
There certainly are private sector owner-operators who have 
developed their businesses from nothing based on an innovative idea 
or perceived market opportunity.23 In the various surveys undertaken 
since the early 1990s they have been found in all industrial sectors 
and activities, including mining and heavy industry, as well as 
light industry, processing, retail and service industries. In general 
most private sector owner-operators remain small-scale. As their 
business grows and they wish to scale up, the pressure for access to 
factors of production - investment capital, land, labour and political 
permission -- essentially dictates that successful private entrepreneurs 
have to surrender part of their equity to local government and accept 
incorporation as collective sector enterprises. As with TVEs and 
those companies that have developed from within the state sector 
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and state administration, the potential for confusion over ownership 
and control is often high. 
In Hangzhou during the late 19ROs a disgruntled workshop 
technician left his job to branch out on his own, reckoning that even 
if his income went down he would be happier working for himself. 
He established a series of bee-hives and produced honey and sold 
it himself to local restaurants and hotels. After two years he had 
managed to payoff his debts and save some capital so he decided 
to establish his own restaurant. This in turn was a great success, 
leaving him after three years with capital to invest further in a new 
undertaking. Thinking he would like to move into manufacturing, 
he looked around for a product, finally deciding to establish a 
food-processor manufacturing plant. (He had found the machine 
mentioned in the translation of a Graham Greene novel and not 
knowing what it was had investigated further, and realised that there 
was, or would probably be, a market in China.) Unfortunately as a 
private entrepreneur he had no access to bank loans and had been 
denied land to build his factory by the local authority. It was not until 
he accepted the invitation of the local government to cooperate (and 
surrender half his equity) in the development of a new collective 
sector enterprise that he was able to proceed. 
In Jiexiu County, Shanxi, Li Anmin, now President and General 
Manager of the Antai International Enterprise Group Company, and 
one of the province's richest individuals, established a coke production 
company as a private enterprise in 1984. He had been the village 
accountant in his home village and invested 3,000 yuan RMB of his 
own money, employing 27 of his neighbours. Within ten years the 
enterprise had become a collective stock company through cooperation 
with local government and equity from Li's fellow villagers. By the 
mid-1990s the company had expanded into other activities, including 
cement, clothing and retail, employing 3,500 people.24 
The fourth and final way in which new enterprises have been 
established is through foreign investment. The scope for foreign 
investment has been episodically increased since the mid-1980s, 
leaving relatively few areas of the economy totally restricted though 
regulation remains high. From milk production in Shanxi Province, 
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to luxury wool production in Qinghai Province, to manufacturing 
in Jiaocheng (Shanxi) and Hangzhou, and retail and services in 
Qiongshan (Hainan Province), foreign investment has occurred 
where there are economic opportunities and known relations to 
the local economy. Somewhat confusingly, state sector enterprises, 
TVEs, collective sector enterprises, and private companies have all 
established joint venture operations with external partners. There is 
equally a variety of ownership relationships attending these foreign-
funded enterprise~. Though all have entrepreneurial managers, 
in many cases they are not the originators of the idea leading to 
cooperation. 
Entrepreneurs and wealth 
Estimating the wealth of the PRC's entrepreneurs is not an easy task. 
Most have proven themselves understandably somewhat reticent to 
discuss their wealth at interview. As with business people almost 
universally, there is a tendency to minimize income and earnings 
because of taxation or local fee regulation. The political climate 
for business people has certainly improved over the years, and 
dramatically since the first interviews were conducted in 1991, before 
Deng Xiaoping had undertaken his 'Inspection Tour of the South', 
which reignited the pace of economic reform the following year.25 
Nonetheless, the PRC remains a Communist Party-state governed 
by an ideology which has within recent memory corne down very 
hard not only on business people but on individuals engaging in 
economic activities for personal profit. All the same the available 
evidence would seem to suggest the new entrepreneurs occupy a 
position of considerable wealth.26 Their patterns of conspicuous 
consumption were already becoming apparent during the 1990s, in 
housing, private education for their children, clothing and food.27 
Anecdotally, these seem to have increased dramatically since 2000, 
particularly in the growth of leisure activities in the metropolises of 
Guangdong, Shanghai, Tianjin and Beijing. 
Although the entrepreneurs interviewed have generally been 
reluctant to provide details of their income or earnings, during 
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research in Shanxi in 1996-97 some four in five of those questioned 
were prepared to estimate their monthly cash income: salary plus 
bonuses, and additional payments. Table 1 provides details of 
average estimates adjusted to an annual basis and differentiated by 
categories of entrepreneur and enterprise ownership or management. 
Members of the professional classes (mainly doctors and lawyers) 
were interviewed as part of the same research, and their average 
annual cash income is also provided, together with the provincial 
average income per capita for 1997. 
Table 1: 
Entrepreneurs' cash income: Shanxi Province, 1996-97. 
Yuan RMB (Renminbi) 
Category of entrepreneur 
Manager, State-owned enterprise 
Manager, collective sector enterprise 
Owner, private enterprise 
Manager, foreign-funded enterprise 
Professional 
Provincial average income per capita (1997) 
Annual cash income 
18,627 
17,388 
37,200 
18,000 
3,700 
4,762 
Source: Interviews, Shanxi 1996-97 (47 managers, state-owned enterprises; 56 
managers, collective sector enterprises; 51 owners, private enterprises; 7 managers, 
foreign-funded enterprises; 11 professionals). 
The differences in average earnings between the various categories 
of the new entrepreneurs and ordinary people indicated in this table 
are clearly large. Owner-operators in the private sector would seem to 
have cash earnings almost eight times the provincial average income 
per capita, and other categories of the new entrepreneurs earn just 
under four times the provincial average. In Hangzhou in the early 
1990s the differences between the new rich and the provincial average 
was estimated at about 12:1 so these ratios are somewhat lower and 
may be accounted for by the earlier stage of development of the Shanxi 
Provincial economy, which had considerably less foreign investment 
and light industrial development. 
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Necessarily these figures have to be treated with caution, not simply 
because of the methods of data gathering, but also as indicators of 
wealth. Business people often have cost-less (to them personally) 
access to resources and effectively subsidised income not available 
to others. Under state socialism, and even under state socialism in 
transition, similar benefits of food, housing, education, access to 
transport (especially use of cars), and holidays also applied to almost 
all those working within the Party-state. It is, for example, extremely 
unlikely that the professionals interviewed during 1996-97, whose 
average cash earnings are reflected in Table 1, would have had a 
lower than average standard of living, and they would be more likely 
to share the life-style aspirations of those they came into contact 
with within the Party-state if not across all the categories of new 
entrepreneurs. 
Another way of attempting to estimate the wealth of the new 
entrepreneurs would be to consider the flows of money that they 
control and are ultimately responsible for. Table 2 provides details of 
information revealed through interviews with entrepreneurs in Shanxi 
(1996-98) about enterprise profits after tax, and in Qiongshan (2004) 
and Mianyang (2005) about annual enterprise turnover. The figures 
for each locality are contrasted with the appropriate local average 
income per capita at the time the interviews were undertaken. While 
the figures presented in Table 2 must also be treated with caution, 
they do serve to underline the key position of the new entrepreneurs 
in terms of wealth creation, and to indicate considerable disparities 
in terms of at least wealth management between entrepreneurs and 
the rest of the population. 
Of course this is not to argue that all entrepreneurs are fantastically 
wealthy. Those who have been interviewed over the years include 
a number on the edge of bankruptcy, and at least one once private 
entrepreneur who was being bailed out by the local government 
because he was a large-scale employer whose business was in trouble. 
Others were simply not successful or just ran very modest businesses. 
Typically, single retail outlets, beauty salons and one-person service 
industry activities were private enterprises of a small business type 
to be found almost universally around the world. The averages 
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detailed in Tables 1 and 2 are derived from a range of earnings and 
turnover. The Shanxi 1996-97 interviews, for example, found a private 
entrepreneur whose annual personal cash income was estimated 
as low as 3,000 yuan RMB, and several others with estimated cash 
earnings in excess of 70,000 yuan RMB. 
Table 2: 
Indicators of economic scale: average enterprise profits or turnover 
YuanRMB 
Location Date of Average 
interviews income per 
capita 
Shanxi 1996-98 4,762 (1997) Average enterprise 
profits after tax 
State enterprises 
Urban collectives 
Rural collectives 
Private enterprises 
Qiongshan 2004 12,697 Average enterprise 
annual turnover 
Mianyang 2005 8,383 Average enterprise 
annual turnover 
YuanRMB 
million 
24.3 
29.8 
4.2 
0.3 
24.0 
58.0 
Source: Interviews, Shanxi 1996-98 (230 interviewees); Qiongshan, 2004 (53 
interviewees); Mianyang, 2005 (56 interviewees). 
Entrepreneurs and the Party-state 
By any standard, economic development in the PRC - whether 
in the 1950s or later in the 1980s - fits well into the pattern of late 
industrialisation identified as having been established by Germany, 
Japan and Russia during the late nineteenth century. In these countries 
the state played a central role in industrialisation, as opposed to the 
laissez-faire capitalism of the earlier European experience based on the 
protection of the role of the individual outside the state.28 With very 
few exceptions29 most research on the socia-economic changes of PRC 
reform since 1978, and particularly that related to industrialisation30 
highlights the centrality of the Party-state in generating change. 
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Debate centres on the extent to which the Party-state is itself involved 
in entrepreneurial activities, as opposed to supporting the economic 
activities of enterprises and entrepreneurs.31 
The relationship between the new entrepreneurs and the Party-state 
is generally very close, though in a number of different ways. Quite 
apart from the delivery of the policy settings that have made change 
possible and the government arrangements at the local level that 
support such development, many of the enterprises for which they are 
now responsible have grown out of Party-state activities. Where ne,,\' 
entrepreneurs did not already participate formally in the activities 
of the Party-state, particularly at leadership levels, they have now 
found themselves fully incorporated; and many new entrepreneurs 
would appear to depend on family networks of influence grounded 
in the Party-state. Remarkably, these networks of relationships and 
influence even extend to small-scale business people in the private 
sector of the economy. 
As already indicated in the description of the processes of enterprise 
development during the reform era, it is clear that a large proportion 
of the new companies have either emerged from the Party-state or 
have become subject to close local government involvement as they 
have grown. Ownership relations may be complex and confused, but 
the continued growth of the subsidiaries of state sector enterprises, 
state administration-run economic activities, as well as of a collective 
sector whose theoretical status is long since challenged, provide ample 
evidence of the continued importance of the economic relationship 
between the new entrepreneurs and the Party-state outside of the 
formal plan. For the last decade it has certainly seemed more sensible 
to regard the collective sector of the economy as the local government 
sector, rather than, as was previously the case, that part of the PRe 
state economy not fully regulated by the central planning process. 
One of the consequences of the growth of the collective sector 
is that the ranks of the new entrepreneurs contain many who have 
come directly from the professional and managerial middle classes. 
In the Shanxi Province interviews of 1996-98, 72 per cent of the state 
enterprise managers interviewed had come from a professional 
or managerial career, as had 79 per cent of the managers of urban 
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collectives, 62 per cent of managers of rural collectives and 42 per 
cent of private enterprise owner-operators. In interviews with women 
entrepreneurs in Jiaocheng (2003-04), 19 per cent had previously 
been employed in professional or managerial work. Of the women 
entrepreneurs interviewed in Qiongshan (2004), 19 per cent had a 
similar background, though in Mianyang (2004-95) the figure was 
36 per cent. 
As might be expected, given both the structures of state socialism 
and the ways in which enterprise formation has occurred, a substantial 
proportion of those working professionally or managerially before 
becoming entrepreneurs had been employed within the Party-state. 
At the same time, as already noted, it has been possible for private 
entrepreneurs to establish themselves independently and to develop 
their business activities quite successfully before being required to 
cooperate with local government or other arms of the Party-state if 
they desired to maintain a growth trajectory. One of the costs expected 
of private entrepreneurs following this path is that they will take up 
the challenge of local leadership positions. Often the deal is quite 
explicit. One coal mine developer in Shanxi told at interview how 
he not only had to surrender half his equity to the local (county) 
government in order to be permitted to establish his enterprise 
(although he argued that the company in his view remained private 
and his property) but he had to be prepared to join the CCP (which 
he had steadfastly refused to do up until that point) and to hold a 
leadership position on the county CCP committee. 
The requirement on the new entrepreneurs is not always so formal 
or to fill such an important leadership position within the Party-state. 
Certainly there has been a growing imperative for successful business 
people to join the CCP, and indeed one of the key aspects of Jiang 
Zemin's principle of 'The Three Represents' was the recognition 
that business people should be both able and encouraged to join the 
CCp, for the first time since 1955.32 Most of those who had started 
out as small scale private entrepreneurs and grown their business 
through cooperation with local government would have subsequently 
been expected to join the CCP, though not necessarily to assume 
positions of leadership. At the same time there are other ways in 
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which successful new entrepreneurs are encouraged to participate 
in and support the Party-state, notably through being recognized 
as provincial and national model entrepreneurs and having their 
experiences well publicised for emulation through the media, as 
well as being elected as deputies to county, provincial and national 
people's congresses. Amongst those interviewed many had been feted 
as model entrepreneurs. There were several who had been elected 
as deputies to provincial people's congresses and two who had been 
elected to the national people's congress: a one-time university bio-
chemist who had returned to his home town in Shanxi to establish an 
enterprise based on developing coal by-products; and the man who 
had led the development of the luxury wool processing industry in 
Qinghai Province. 
Although it would seem logical to assume that many of the 
enterprises to have been established in the era of reform are owned or 
established by leading cadres, or at least that leading cadres engage 
in such processes, the evidence of the various interviews undertaken 
since 1991 is that this, almost totally, has not been the case. While it 
is conceivable that the methods of interviewee selection would have 
largely precluded the possibility of encountering leading cadres 
as entrepreneurs, the amount of time spent in fieldwork in given 
locations and the degree of familiarity developed would have most 
likely provided some pointers and information to activities of that 
kind had they been present. There was no such anecdotal evidence 
generated. 
At the same time though it would appear to be the case that family 
ties to leading cadres in the Party-state do appear to be important to 
the process of enterprise formation. The evidence from the Shanxi 
Province interviews undertaken 1996-98 is that there is a definite 
three-generation pattern. Leading cadres are on the whole recruited 
on intellectual merit from amongst the peasantry, as has long been 
CCP practice under the PRe. They do their jobs and retire but it is 
their children who go on to become business people, in particular 
building on the local relationships and networks of influence that 
their parents have developed.33 As one entrepreneur, who had 
developed a medium-sized iron and steel plant on a green field site in 
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the locality where his father had been CCP secretary for many year~, 
said at interview, when asked about why he had joined one of the 
state sponsored democratic political parties and not the CCP, 'Why 
should I join the CCP? My father owns the village'. 
Certainly, all the interviews suggest quite strongly that while 
it is not necessary for the new entrepreneurs to be CCP members 
themselves, it is extremely helpful for their families to have been 
members of the CCP and to have been part of the Party-state. Even 
allowing that the samples chosen for the interviews cannot be held 
directly representative of either the population as a whole or even 
necessarily of the entrepreneurs in each locality, the proportion of 
those whose families were linked into various networks of influence 
of this kind is too high to be ignored. Currently about 5.4 per cent of 
the total population of the PRC are members of the CCP, though the 
proportion was somewhat lower during the 1990s. 
In the Shanxi 1996-98 interviews, 60 per cent of the private 
enterprise owner-operators were not members of the CCP 
themselves, but 39 per cent had at least one parent who was; 
35 per cent of the 'managers' of collective sector enterprises were 
not themselves members of the CCP but again 39 per cent had at 
least one parent who was. Similar proportions are to be found in 
the other interviews. In Jiaocheng in 2003-04 only 24 per cent of 
the entrepreneurs themselves were either members of the CCP or 
had some other direct connection to the Party-state, as opposed 
to 42 per cent of their fathers. In Qiongshan (2004) similarly only 
23 per cent of those interviewed were members of the CCP or had 
a direct Party-state connection, compared to 40 per cent of their 
fathers. In the Mianyang interviews (2004-05) the proportions were 
somewhat higher: 35 per cent of those interviewed were members 
of the CCP or directly involved in the Party-state, while 50 per cent 
of their fathers were. In the Jiaocheng interviews 58 per cent of 
those interviewed had either a father or a father-in-law (the 
interviewed entrepreneurs were all women) who was a member 
of the CCP; in Qiongshan the proportion was 55 per cent, and in 
Mianyang 66 per cent. 
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New entrepreneurs and the middle class 
Inevitably social change in the PRC is both sui generis and reminiscent 
of processes that have occurred in other political systems. The 
complications, from a comparative perspective, in analysing the 
PRC is that the starting point for recent change has been a late 
industrialising state socialist system that has chosen to introduce 
market reforms. Ownership, management and control are intertwined 
in ways that cut across previous analyses of middle (or indeed any 
other) class behaviour. 
On the one hand, the new entrepreneurs are not a new middle class 
because there has been a long established professional and managerial 
class. While many come from managerial backgrounds and occupy 
positions that revolve around their control of enterprises, many have 
a far greater emotional investment in their own personal position 
in the enterprise than this term usually implies. Nor for the most 
part do new entrepreneurs generally represent the middle income 
sections of the population. On the other hand, to the extent that a 
rising middle class may act with economic development to become 
the backbone of the ruling class, then it is possible to see similar 
processes in formation in the PRe. The difference of course is that the 
PRC remains a Communist Party-state and that the new entrepreneurs 
far from being excluded have been targeted for incorporation into 
the political establishment. 
These observations highlight the objectives of the various discourses 
of middle classness to be found both inside the PRC and outside. 
Within the PRC there is a clear ideological constraint in promoting 
and wealth economic growth, even as the third decade of such policy 
settings draws to an end. Promoting the new entrepreneurs and the 
new rich as the new middle classes is somewhat more egalitarian 
and certainly generally more acceptable than describing them as the 
super-wealthy or the new bourgeoisie. 
Encouraging the development of the new middle classes is also 
generally a way of promoting individual initiative and self-driven 
economic growth, as well as wealth creation. In society as a whole it 
is probably more comfortable as well as generally more acceptable 
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for individuals to articulate their middle class aspirations than those 
of being an A-list mega-star. Certainly specifically described middle 
class aspirations can he portrayed as, ;md allipd to, modernisation 
and desirable life-styles through the mass media of communication. 
Outside the PRC it does sometimes seem that those who are 
attempting to interpret its development really do want to be able to 
find the middle class in its contemporary social change. While a full 
pxplanation of that phenomenon lies elsewhere, one clear possibility 
is that the PRC's transformation is seen as hopeful by those who see 
an equation between industrialisation and economic development on 
the one hand and the emergence of a peace ensuring liberal democracy 
on the other. The argument that these are people 'just like us' is very 
seductive, especially if it is delivered without any hint of irony. 
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